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This paper attempts to investigate how the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) have impaired the capacity of Euro Zone (EZ) national authorities to 
conduct discretionary fiscal policy. We estimate fiscal determinants for the structural 
(discretionary) public deficit over the period of 1981-2010, estimating panel data equations 
in order to increase the strength of the test by enhancing the time series dimension of the 
data by the cross section. We find that the degree of the countrecyclicality of discretionary 
fiscal policy has been reduced significantly after the Maastricht Treaty. Also, there is 
empirical evidence that national fiscal rules have a significant positive impact in budgetary 
outcomes. Regarding the recent reform of the European governance framework, we consider 
that the context of the reform seems incapable of dealing with the factors which are 
responsible for the sovereign debt crisis. We stress the need for reforms in the financial 
sector which seem necessary to ensure in association with sound fiscal policies the stability 
in euro area.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The debt crisis in the Eurozone (EZ) is one of the most crucial challenges in 
modern economic history. The decline of public finances of many member states 
constitutes an explosive mixture that threatens the existence of the Eurozone itself 
and has significant impacts for the global economy. As the leadership of EU is still 
searching for solutions and actions which will counteract the problem and restore the 
stability, the analysis of the causes which led to the systemic crisis, the examination 
of the institutional framework of European governance and the evaluation of the 
measures and policies adopted, are considered as matters of great importance which 
require extensive analysis and critical approach. The current paper attempts to 
approach these aspects from the perspective of fiscal policy, examining them from 
both a theoretical and empirical background.  
Membership in the Eurozone implies that apart from the delegation of 
monetary policy to the conservative European Central Bank (ECB), there are 
obligations and restrictions on fiscal policy for the member states. Even though the 
latter remains a political tool into the hands of national authorities, they must 
comply with the rules set at EU level in order the stability to be achieved. The 
implementation of sound and disciplined fiscal policies and the coordination of them 
in central level are key elements for ensuring the financial stability in the 
eurosystem.  
As the project of European integration was not associated with a fiscal 
union, the member states have maintained the independence of their national fiscal 
policies. However, their autonomy is limited significantly by the existence of the 
euro zone’s supranational fiscal rule. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) offers 
guidance and coordinates the implementation of fiscal policy through the obligation 
of member states to respect the rules and the procedures that the Pact predicts. The 
target of the SGP is to perform effectively a dual function: to ensure the 
sustainability of public finances prompting the governments to run sound policies 
and to provide the necessary flexibility so as the national authorities to be able to 
deal with the negative fluctuations of the business cycle. 
This paper consists of two parts. In the first section, we are trying to 
acknowledge the particular structure of fiscal policy in EMU context. We examine 
empirically how the restrictions of Maastricht criteria and the SGP have impaired 
the capacity of national authorities to run countercyclical discretionary fiscal 
policies and whether the stabilization function of fiscal policy is associated with less 
procyclical discretionary policies. The division of the EZ countries into two 
subgroups (north – south) will provide us useful conclusions about the different 
effects the constraints have had on rich north and poor south. Lastly, we will 
evaluate whether the national fiscal rules can counteract political indiscipline and 
their efficiency on budget outcomes.       
In the second section, we will approach the recent reform of the European 
governance, providing details of the reform package and discussing its 
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appropriateness and its potential effectiveness on the restore of the European 
financial stability.   
 
 
2.  Discretionary Fiscal Policy in the EMU: An Empirical Approach 
 
The main objective of the empirical analysis is to examine to what extent the 
constraints of both Maastricht criteria and SGP have affected the way national 
authorities conduct their discretionary fiscal policy. Provided that the monetary 
policy of all countries in the Eurozone is managed by the ECB, the fiscal policy 
undertakes the responsibility to operate as a stabilizing tool of the business cycle and 
to counteract the negative asymmetric shocks. Consequently, it is the foremost tool 
in the quiver of governments to deal with their country-specific fluctuations. For this 
reason, we would expect that the process of European integration should be linked to 
the adoption by the member-states of more countercyclical discretionary fiscal 
policies. On the other hand, the existence of the Pact sets constraints and limitations 
on the conduct of fiscal policy. The question we want to answer is whether these 
constraints prevent the stabilizing role of fiscal policy and if this hypothesis is 
supported by the empirical findings. 
Making clear what the stabilizing role of authorities means, the governments 
tend to implement restrictive monetary and fiscal policies during booms and loose 
policies during recessions so as to stabilize the cycle. A rational assumption is that 
we should expect that European monetary union would be associated with the 
conduct of more strongly countercyclical fiscal policies which will affect negatively 
the budget outcome in times of economic recession as this is the way fiscal policy 
plays a stabilizing role in business cycles. 
This analysis is based on that of Gali and Perotti (2003) aiming to amend 
and extend it. Specifically, we use historical data until the year of 2010 and we add 
in our model the variable of national fiscal rules. From a methodological 
perspective, our empirical approach focuses on the variables that constitute 
indicators of discretionary fiscal policy such as the structural deficit or cyclically 
unadjusted deficit. It is essential to make a distinction between the changes in fiscal 
policy that occur as specific measures decided by national authorities discretionarity 
and the changes as a result of the general economic conditions that affect the 
automatic stabilizers. The level of the deficit consists of the cyclical deficit which is 
the result of business cycle fluctuations rising during recessions and falling during 
booms since the cyclical deficit acts as an automatic stabilizer and the structural 
deficit which shows how large the deficit would be if the economy were operating at 
full employment (potential real output) and demonstrates the impacts of the actions 
adopted by the national authorities whose objective is to cope with the endogenous 
or exogenous (such as the financing of a war) fluctuations of the cycle. A typical 
example of the cyclical deficit is the reduction of tax revenues and the increase of 
payments for social insurance during recessions. 
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3.  Methodology 
 
The first step is to examine the stationarity characteristics of each time 
series. Actually, there are numerous econometric techniques to test for the existence 
of a unit root. In the current study, we use the popular Augmented Dickey – Fuller 
methodology (ADF) (Dickey and Fuller, 1979).3  
The ADF test is based on the following regression (Kaskarelis 1993):  
 
 
where Δ is the first difference operator, t is time and ε t  is the error term. 
In case the cyclical component is stationary, the secular component has a unit root 
and Y follows a random walk process i.e. the change in Y is absolutely random. 
Algebraically a random walk has the following form:   + . Furthermore, if 
α0, then Y follows a random walk process with a drift. A drift process is 
represented as follows:   + α + . Note that the lag dependent 
polynomial is incorporated with the aim to deal with the potential serial correlation 
of the residuals.  
However, it is well-known that regarding panel data series, the standard unit 
root tests based on individual time series are not the appropriate techniques to 
employ as they do not work effectively. This is why we tend to apply panel data unit 
root tests that are employed in the investigation of statistical properties in panel data 
analysis. The results provided by the panel data unit root tests will be more reliable 
since the panel data analysis increases the strength of the test by enhancing the time 
series dimension of the data by the cross section. There are several panel unit root 
tests, some of the most popular are the following: the ADF - Fisher Chi-square 
(Maddala and Wu,1999), PP – Fisher Chi-square (Choi, 2001), the LLC (Levin, Lin 
and Chu, 2002) and the IPS (Im, Pesaran and Shin, 2003)4. For our analysis, we use 
                                               
3 
 There are several unit root tests that can be used such as the test of Zivot and Andrews (1992) , the 
IPS test (Im et al. 1997), the MW test (Maddala and Wu, 1999), or the Choi test (Choi, 2001). 
4  While the LLC test allows for heterogeneity of individual deterministic effects and a heterogeneous 
serial correlation structure, it assumes the presence of a homogeneous autoregressive root under the 
alternative. The latter is identified as a serious limitation for the LLC test. The LLC test procedure 
involves using pooled t-statistics of the estimator to evaluate the hypothesis of non-stationarity of each 
individual time series. The more recently developed IPS tests overcame the limitation of the LLC test 
by allowing for heterogeneity of the autoregressive root under the alternative. The IPS test is simple to 
calculate and allows for residual serial correlation and heterogeneity of dynamics across groups. 
However, simulations indicate that the IPS test is sensitive to a correct choice of lag orders in the 
underlying ADF regressions; the power of the t-bar test is more favorably affected by a rise in time 
dimension of the data than the cross-section units of the data; and the interpretation of the IPS test 
results are difficult because of the heterogeneous nature of the alternative hypothesis. Maddala and 
Wu’s (1999) and Choi’s (2001) tests were similar in the way that both suggested panel unit root tests 
performed using a Fisher statistic, but they were developed to overcome the shortcomings of the LLC 
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the method of ADF – Fisher Chi-square as an alternative approach to the unit root 
tests. The ADF – Fisher Chi-square test combines the p-values from the individual 
unit root tests and allows for individual unit root processes so that p-values vary 
across cross-sections. 
The ADF - Fisher Chi-square is based on the following regression (Baltagi, 
2001; Fischer, 1932): 
P = -2  
The hypothesis that we have to evaluate is : = 0 against the alternative :  <0 
(the series are weakly stationary or trend stationary). The ADF - Fisher Chi-square 
test was applied both on the initial original variables of the models and their first 
differences. Most of the original variables are non-stationary however their first 
differences are stationary.  
Moreover, in order to choose the appropriate coefficient covariance method, 
we work in full accordance with the Arellano asymptotics (1987). If Τ (number of 
periods) is greater than Ν (number of cross sections) and T<2N we use the method 
of White diagonal with Cross Section weights, while if Τ>2Ν we use the method of 
White Cross section with Cross Section SUR weights. As a result, for models 2,4 we 
use the method of White diagonal while for models 1,3, the method of White Cross 
section.  
Finally, our sample consists of the data of the 11 initial members – states of 
the Eurozone (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece5, Netherlands, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). The data are on annual basis, come from the 
database of OECD and cover the time period 1981-2010, and capturing traces of the 
current crisis.  
 
4.  Empirical Analysis Results  
 
A useful starting point for our empirical analysis would be to regress the 
following relation: 
 =  +  +  +  (1) 
where  is the deficit of general government as a share of GDP,  is the output 
gap and  is the lagged variable of deficit. 
The concept is to regress an indicator of fiscal policy on a cyclical indicator, 
so we will estimate the relation between the cyclically unadjusted deficit of general 
                                                                                                                         
and the IPS tests. Maddala and Wu’s (1999) and Choi’s (2001) tests solves the problems related to 
previously mentioned tests by providing the combination of probability values for a unit root tests 
applied to each group in the data set. With this in mind, we employed the LLC, the IPS, ADF-Fisher 
and PP-Fisher panel unit root tests in this paper. For the LLC and IPS test, the optimal lag length is 
determined according to Schwarz criteria. 
5 Greece joined EMU in 2001. 
122 
 
European Research Studies,  Volume XV, Issue (2), 2012 
 
government and the output gap which is an economic measure of the difference 
between the actual output of an economy and the potential output (the output that 
can be produced at full employment). The use of the lagged variable helps us to 
account for the likely of error autocorrelation and it allows explanatory variables to 
have effects beyond the current period.  
Even though this relation does not identify the systemic response of national 
authorities as discretionary policy to the fluctuations of the cycle, it provides a 
useful descriptive relation between public finances and cyclical activity. Our results 
demonstrate the contribution of cyclical conditions on the implementation of 
balanced or surplus budgets and hence on the ensuring of the sustainability of public 
debt.    
The table displays the results for our specification. Even if our model is 
simplistic, it has an appealing interpretative capacity.  The explanatory variables are 
statistically significant at the significance level of 95%. Particularly, the results 
demonstrate a clear positive relation between the level of cyclically unadjusted 
deficit and the output gap. A reduction in the negative output gap or an increase in 
the positive output gap by 1%, would reduce the level of deficit by 0,5%. It would 
be wrong to conclude that the national authorities tend to conduct procyclical fiscal 
policy due to the fact that we have not used the appropriate indicators of 
discretionary policy in our specification. 
Interpreting the empirical results of the model 1, they highlight the 
weaknesses in the structure of SGP. Regarding the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
(EDP) which includes the imposition of fines in the case there is a deficit in excess 
of 3% of GDP, we approve of the reviews which state that the SGP restricts the 
necessary flexibility fiscal policy should have in order to stabilize the cycle. 
Moreover, the SGP should take into account the growth rate of member-states and 
also their position into the business cycle since the rule refers to the cyclically 
unadjusted deficit (debt dynamics equation: g – t + (r – x)b = ) and to the structural 
deficit.  
In order to examine how authorities utilize fiscal policy as a tool to stabilize 
the fluctuation of business cycle, we use the structural deficit as an indicator of 
fiscal policy stance. An additional problem that must be addressed is to determine 
properly the timing of fiscal policy decisions so as we will be able to define the 
nature of the variable, the national authorities react to. Actually, the measures are 
usually decided approximately a year before their implementation, excluding 
exceptional cases. Therefore, national authorities’ decisions should be based on the 
expectation of the output gap, conditional available on information available in the 
period t-1 (  ).  However, reality proves that the process of policy making is 
characterized by complexity and inertia, so a plausible alternative would be to 
assume that the structural deficit responds to the output gap in the period t-1, 
rejecting a forward looking approach. Furthermore, in our model we incorporate the 
variable of the measure of gross debt relative to potential output gap as a debt 
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stabilization motive (Gali and Perotti, 2003; Bohn, 1998; Wyplosz, 2002) and the 
variable of the lagged dependent variable (by one year) in order to avoid 
autocorrelation error and to deal with endogeneity possibilities6.  The introduction of 
these two explanatory variables enables us to take into account the initial limitations 
faced by the government. The resulting specification we estimate is the following: 
 =  +  +  +  +  (2) 
where  structural deficit divided by potential output,  is the output 
gap for the period t-1,  is the gross debt of general government as a share of 
GDP for the period t-1 and  is the  lagged dependent variable.  
A negative (positive) value of the coefficient  implies that fiscal 
authorities use discretionary fiscal policy in a countercyclical (procyclical) way. A 
negative value of the coefficient , as well as a value of the coefficient  less 
than 1, implies that policymakers are subject to initial restrictions regarding the level 
of deficit and debt (Gali and Perotti, 2003). The higher the initial level of debt or 
deficit, the lower they conduct strongly countercyclical discretionary policy. Since 
our primary objective is to detect whether the constraints of Maastricht criteria and 
SGP have impaired the way policymakers conduct discretionary fiscal policy, we 
split our sample into two sub periods: the pre-Maastricht period and the post-
Maastricht period. The first sub period covers observations for the period from 1981 
to 1991 (one year before the criteria of Maastricht Treaty come into force).  The 
empirical results for this period will demonstrate the tendency of policymakers in 
fiscal policy making process and how they conduct discretionary policy without 
constraints and limitations. We estimate the following version: 
 =  +  +  +  +  (2a) 
where the initials BM and ΑΜ refer to pre-Maastricht and post-Maastricht periods 
respectively.    
Looking at the results of the model 2a from the table, in the pre-Maastrich 
period when governments had at their disposal also the monetary policy as a 
stabilizing tool, they tended to utilize the tools of fiscal policy in a systemic 
countercyclical way. The coefficient of output gap has a negative value which 
indicates that policymakers conduct restrictive fiscal policy during booms and loose 
fiscal policy during recessions. As far as the initial restrictions are concerned, we 
notice that initial limitations exist only in respect of the initial level of deficit, while 
the higher the initial debt, the lower the structural deficit national authorities set 
discretionarily. The magnitude of the gross debt does not constitute a deterrent 
                                               
6 Dealing with the problem of endogeneity is a complicated task. In econometric theory, it is vague 
whether a variable is endogenous or exogenous. It depends on the assumptions made by the analyst and 
his theoretical background. A way to deal with the “fear” of endogeneity is to use an instrumental 
variable which allows consistent estimation when the dependent variable causes at least one of the 
explanatory variables. That means that there is a reverse causation and our results are biased.  
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factor for the adoption of countercyclical fiscal policy. Note that both the model and 
the independent variables are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.   
The second sub period under examination covers the period from 1992 
(when the criteria of Maastricht came into force regarding the membership in the 
Eurozone) to 2010 including the effects of the adoption of the supranational rule for 
EZ member states. 
 =  +  +  +  +  (2b) 
The results of the analysis support our hypothesis that the integration of 
monetary policy with a clear mandate to the focus on the target of price stability is 
associated with countercyclical fiscal policies in the EMU countries even if the 
flexibility of fiscal policy is being reduced when the medium-term target of the SGP 
has not been achieved. Nevertheless, even though the explanatory variable is not 
statistically significant at level lower than 20%, there is an indicative tendency of a 
significant reduction in the degree of countercyclicality of discretionary fiscal 
policy. Additionally, it is concluded that the supranational fiscal rule for the level of 
deficit has significantly limited the capacity of policymakers to use fiscal policy a 
stabilizing tool of the cycle as the empirical data confirm the failure of member-
states (especially France and Germany) to comply with the rule. 
Now, we repeat the same exercise, having divided our sample into two sub 
groups. We split our sample of countries into the poor south or PIGS (including 
Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland) and the rich north (including Germany, 
France, Finland, Austria, Belgium and Netherlands). This will enable us to extract 
the different features and the asymmetries between the two sub groups as far as the 
conduct of fiscal policy is related.  The pattern that emerges, shows that the southern 
European countries run systematically countercyclical discretionary fiscal policies in 
the post-Maastricht period which is statistically significant at 0,05 level, but there is 
a reduction in the degree of countercyclicality from the pre-Maastricht period which 
is statistically significant at 0,10 level. On the other hand, regarding the northern 
countries, they appear to conduct procyclical discretionary policies in the post-
Maastricht period in contrast to the previous when there is a statistically significant 
negative relation between structural deficit and output gap. The above finding 
demonstrates an aspect of the decreasing synchronization among the counterparts of 
the Eurozone7.   
Following the lead of several authors, we also incorporate into our model 
the independent variable of national numerical fiscal rules (Iara and Wolff,2010; 
Debrun et al., 2008 Ayuso-i-Casals et al., 2006; Commission, 2007; Deroose et al., 
2006). Apart from the rules imposed by the SGP, there are numerous national fiscal 
rules which are designed to prevent the decline of public finances and to hit the 
                                               
7 Papageorgiou et al. (2010) testify a decreasing synchronization among the counterparts of the emu 
zone after the introduction of the euro coin". 
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profligacy of governments. A concise definition of the national fiscal rule is the one 
proposed by Kopits and Symansky (1998) which defines the national fiscal rule as 
"a permanent constraint on fiscal policy, expressed in terms of a summary indicator 
of fiscal performance”. In order to meet the needs of the scientific research, 
Commission firstly compiled a dataset on national fiscal rules in force across EU 
countries and then created the Fiscal Rule Strength Index which evaluates 
numerically the strength and the efficiency of domestic fiscal rules. Five criteria 
have been taken into consideration: the statutory/legal base of the rule, the room for 
setting or revising objectives, the nature of the body in charge of monitoring respect 
and enforcement of the rule, the enforcement mechanisms of the rule and the media 
visibility of the rule8. The ranking of the index takes values from -1,12 to 1,549. The 
use of the variable of national fiscal rules enables us to evaluate the contribution of 
domestic restrictions on the conduct of balanced budgetary outcomes and to what 
extend their strength affects the level of the structural deficit produced. The resulting 
specification that we estimate is thus: 
 =  +   +  +  +  +  (3) 
The most natural interpretation of the above findings is that there is an 
undeniably positive relation between domestic fiscal rules index and the level of 
structural deficit. The higher the fiscal rule strength index is for a country, the 
greater contribution of domestic constraints on the level of deficit produced. 
However, this relation is not statistically significant at a level lower than 25%. 
Moreover we find that the presence of national numerical fiscal rules increase the 
extent of countercyclicality of fiscal policy.  Finally, it must be noted that there is a 
strong negative relation between the output gap for the period t-1 and the structural 
deficit for the period which proves one more time that governments run strongly 
countercyclical discretionary fiscal policy. 
Table 1. Panel Data Regression Results 
Independent 
variables  
Model 1 Model 2 (a-b) Model 2 (southern countries) 
 
Output gap t-1  -0.167585 
(-2.017307)* 
-0.047525 
(-1.243943) 
-0.255622 
(-1.823910)** 
-0,089698 
(-1,917188)** 
Gross debt t-1   0.087848 
(2.383029)* 
0.024174 
(3.791262)* 
0,151052 
(5,757249)* 
0,027754 
(3,016101)* 
Lagged adjusted 
deficit  
 0.288348 
(2.084699)* 
0.813873 
(19.52911)* 
0,336790 
(2,133473)* 
0,812107 
(15,27963)* 
Output gap  0.499090 
(5.510424)* 
 
   
                                               
8http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_governance/documents/fiscal_rules_calculat
ion_fiscal_rule_index_2010.pdf 
9http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_governance/fiscal_rules/index_en.htm 
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Table 1. Panel Data Regression Results (cont’d) 
Independent 
variables  
Model 1 Model 2 (a-b) Model 2 (southern countries) 
 
Deficit t-1 0.715293 
(9.988716)* 
 
   
Fiscal Rules 
Index 
     
Constant  -0.741778 
(-3.126519)* 
-9.828870 
(-3.392398)* 
-2.192489 
(-4.494069)* 
-17,11492 
(-8,660905)* 
-2,889977 
(-3,542233)* 
R2  0.759422 0.841258 0.874724 0.694813 0,838122 
Durbin-Watson  
stat 
1.530709 1.612692 1.856546 1.559896 1,693448 
F-stat 75.08105 32.23887 104.7353 8,130985 64,34871 
Countries 
included  
11 10 11 5 5 
Total panel 
observations  
283 86 209 33 95 
Coef. 
Covariance 
Method 
White Cross 
section 
White 
diagonal 
White 
diagonal 
White Cross 
section 
White Cross 
section 
Period 1981 - 2010 1981 - 1991 1992 - 2010 1981 – 1991 1992 - 2010 
 
Independent variables  Model  2 (northern countries) Model 3 
Output gap t-1 -0.131373 
(-2.161651)* 
0.065972 
(1.050242) 
-0.092046 
(-2.108149)* 
 
Gross debt t-1 0.012280 
(0.639387) 
0.015535 
(1.723184)** 
0.019723 
(2.666155)* 
 
Lagged adjusted deficit 0.363182 
(4.012788)* 
0.7443 
(11.70722)* 
0.823360 
(20.25733)* 
 
Output gap     
Deficit t-1     
Fiscal Rules Index   0.202563 
(1.152632) 
 
Constant -3.303735 
(-2.4966613)* 
-1.329439 
(-2.037808)* 
-1.823903 
(-3.387655)* 
 
R2  0.852416 0.839483 0.872487  
Durbin-Watson  stat 2.263396 2.062901 1.928381  
F-stat 37.13004 68.64201 91.88301  
Countries included  5 6 11  
Total panel observations  53 114 114  
Coef. Covariance Method White Cross section White Cross section White diagonal  
Period 1981 - 1991 1992 - 2010 1992 - 2010  
Note: In parenthesis are depicted the t-stat values. Model 1: dependent variable is the cyclically unadjusted 
deficit as a share of GDP. Model 2,3: dependent variable is the structural deficit as a share of potential 
GDP. * the independent variable is statistically significant at 0.05, ** the independent variable is 
statistically significant at 0.10. 
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5.  The Reform of European Governance Framework – A Critical Review 
 
The global financial crisis revealed not only the member states’ real fiscal 
state but also the undercover weaknesses of the European institutional framework of 
European governance. In 2010, the global financial crisis reverted into a debt crisis 
for the entire euro area which is now characterized systemic. In order to overcome 
the impacts of the crisis and to restore stability, the leadership of the EU decided to 
adopt radical measures so as to shield the Eurozone countries from the ongoing and 
a potential future debt crisis. The reform of the European governance is considered 
as a decisive step towards the fiscal and political integration. The second section of 
the paper asks whether these reforms seem sufficient and appropriate to deal with 
the matter of the restore of stability in the EMU.  
Concisely, the reform package contains the following:  
 A stronger version of the Stability and Growth Pact associated 
with more severe enforcement mechanisms and sanctions. Also, 
the introduction of a new debt criterion under the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (corrective arm). 
 A new directive on national budgetary frameworks which 
predicts the setting of minimum requirements in consistency with 
fiscal framework of the EU into the domestic legislation and the 
adoption of the golden rule for balanced national budgets (over the 
cycle). 
 A robust framework for preventing and correcting 
macroeconomic imbalance. The introduction of the Excessive 
Imbalance Procedure aims to identify and alleviate the macro-
economic imbalances via the use of an indicative scoreboard, 
combined with techno-economic judgment.  
 The enhancement of economic coordination with several 
interlinked and coherent policies for sustainable growth, 
convergence and high-level competitiveness through the 
implementation of the Euro Plus Pact. 
 The establishment of a permanent European stability mechanism 
(ESM) which will offer financial assistance to member-states 
incapable of accessing market financing. Access to ESM will be 
provided on the basis of strict economic policy conditionality, 
under an adjustment programme and a rigorous analysis of public-
debt sustainability. ESM will coexist with the EFSF and their 
overall financial capacity will be 500 billion Euros. 
A rational assumption is that the efficiency of the reform package depends 
on the addressing of the factors that caused the crisis. What we can conclude from 
the nature of the reform is that the major problem which must be addressed is the 
profligacy of national authorities and the fiscal indiscipline. This is why the 
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leadership of the EU promoted inter alia the enhancement of the SGP with both 
stricter rules and enforcement mechanisms. Upon this, a question arises: is the fiscal 
indiscipline the root of the European sovereign debt crisis?    
 
5.1 Wrong Approach 
Data analysis shows that the period before the outbreak of the global 
financial recession, the public finances for the euro area were highly satisfactory. 
Particularly, in 2007, the average deficit of the union reached 0,7%, demonstrating 
not only a great reduction of the level of deficit since the beginning of EMU but at 
the same time it was a record low since the 70s. Similarly, the average gross public 
debt declined from 73% in 1998 to 66,5% in 2007, while the level of public 
expenditures decreased by 9 percentage points (Uxo and Paul, 2011). Consequently, 
one conclusion that emerges is that the sovereign debt crisis is not the result of the 
inability of governments to run sound fiscal policies. The countries that have been 
afflicted more by the impacts of the debt crisis used to run prudent fiscal policies in 
compliance with the rules of the SGP (see Spain and Ireland). The great exception to 
this story is the case of Greece, whose governments manipulated the data, producing 
the “famous” Greek statistics. The main reasoning behind the deterioration of the 
public finances can be found in two factors. Firstly, in order to alleviate the 
consequences of the global financial crisis, governments took the responsibility to 
save the banking system providing both liquidity and guarantees and at the same 
time they were forced to sustain economic activity at pre-crisis levels through the 
conduct of loose discretionary fiscal policy (De Grauwe, 2010). These actions 
undertaken by the national authorities, illustrate both the inherent flaws of the 
financial sector and the failure of monetary policy which did not manage to apply 
stricter controls on the functioning of banking system or to provide a regulatory 
framework so as to ensure stability. The recession appears thus to be the result of the 
unsustainable private debt explosion which forced governments to protect the 
private sector from the impacts of bubbles the financial sector itself caused. As a 
result, what we can conclude is that the sovereign debt crisis has been created by a 
combination of complex factors and that the deterioration of public finances seems 
to appear more as a consequence of the crisis and not its fundamental cause.  
 
5.2 Stricter SGP 
The above conclusion raises doubts over the appropriateness of a more 
rigorous rule (as the Commission introduced) whose objective is to counteract the 
current sovereign debt crisis. But beyond this, there are also problems which have 
been identified regarding the expected efficiency of the SGP and its structure in 
general.  
To begin with, in the short term, the direct implementation of the new 
provisions will bring about a wave of measures of austerity which contain huge 
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social cost and will result in the deepening of the recession with dramatic 
consequences for the real economy. This is why the adoption of radical measures 
will undeniably reduce the aggregate demand and will lead to a prolonged decline 
while there will not be any available tool to restore the economy. This is what is 
called vicious cycle. Moreover, the reduction in government expenditure will lead to 
a great fall in activity that gross debt ratio will get even worse, at least in the short 
term. This assumption is based on the fact that the cutting on spending will lower the 
GDP and as a result the gross debt ratio will increase. This will occur only if the 
multiplier (Keynesian models) is higher than 1.0 which means that if the 
government reduces its deficit by 1% of GDP by cutting expenditures while the 
multiplier is 1.8, the spending cut will lower GDP by 1,8% and the debt ratio will 
augment (Gros, 2011).  
The tightening of the rules and the automaticity of enforcement mechanisms 
are going to reduce the flexibility that discretionary fiscal policy should have. Full 
compliance with the mid-term fiscal consolidation plans and the assessment on the 
basis of expenditure developments will definitely disable the capacity of fiscal 
policy to be used as a stabilizing tool for the fluctuations of the business cycle. On 
the other hand, the fact that building on the SGP, budget finances must be expressed 
in structural terms which seems to be in the right direction as it may be proven a 
mean capable of coping with the reasons which provoke the tendency for deficit 
bias10. To sum up, the new revised SGP predicts the conduct of countercyclical 
discretionary fiscal policy only in good times and leaves little room for 
countercyclicality during negative shocks. The necessary balance between flexibility 
and discipline is not achieved.  
Structural problems are not avoided. The new obligation for member-states 
to keep debt below or sufficiently declining towards 60% of GDP seems excessively 
ambitious especially for countries subject to high gross public debt. Tamborini’s 
technical analysis (2011) demonstrates the degree of difficulty of the above target. 
Tamborini attempts to evaluate the new SGP rules by means of dynamic models of 
the debt/GDP ratio focusing on its determinants: the real growth rate, the inflation 
rate and the nominal interest rate on the accumulated debt stock. He finds out that 
the convergence of debt/GDP ratio at 60% and the target of keeping it stable over 
time can be achieved if only if the prerequisite of uniform growth, interests and 
inflation rates for the entire euro area is satisfied. This appears quite difficult since 
the interest rate convergence seems impossible to be achieved due to the historical 
differences in risk measures. Finally, he concludes that heterogeneity and 
interdependence entails different features for m-s regarding the chances of success, 
the efforts and the spillovers towards the SGP target which finally seems infeasible.       
                                               
10 Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011) distinguish six reasons for deficit bias: (i) impatience, 
(ii) informational problems, (iii) common pool problem, (iv) electoral competition, (v) 
exploiting future generations and (vi) time-inconsistency problem. 
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The revised SGP entangles the assignment of national responsibilities 
(decisions on tax policy and public spending) to EU institutions. The role of 
supranational institutions becomes more extensive and gains in power. In particular, 
the Commission may impose sanctions under the jurisdiction of the European Court 
of Justice, it may ask from member states to reduce public expenditure or to adjust 
their tax policy. This entails firstly that there is a democratic deficit in EU affairs 
and secondly that member-states should surrender their national sovereignty to the 
EU. These procedures also lack legitimacy as the European supranational 
institutions do not face the democratic political sanctions of their decisions and 
actions11 (De Grauwe, 2010). 
It is worth mentioning that there are reviews which are in favor of the 
content of the revised SGP but they pose concerns for its efficiency. Their main 
concern is the lack of automatic sanctions. Even though the penalties will have a 
much greater degree of automaticity via the use of reverse QMV12, the lack of 
automatic sanctions will allow member-states to avoid their obligations under the 
Pact, increasing the room of dicretionary maneuvers for the national authorities in 
the European Council (Von Hagen, 2010). Fuest (2011) states that the reform 
package gives a lot of emphasis on the coordination and supervision approach 
instead of introducing more compliance via automatic sanctions and enforcement 
mechanisms. Schuknechat et al. (2011) asks for greater independence for the 
Commission services in its administration of the Pact and restrictions in member 
states right for veto.  
 
5.3 Competitiveness and the Excessive Imbalance Procedure 
It is generally admitted that fiscal policy does not guarantee by itself the 
fiscal stability and therefore should not be examined in isolation. There should be a 
broader macroeconomic surveillance to ensure the sustainability of public finances. 
The existence of excessive macroeconomic imbalances including divergences in 
current account and competitiveness directly affects the public finances and makes 
member-states public finances more vulnerable to negative shocks. In order to shield 
member-states from macroeconomic imbalances, the EU leadership decided to 
introduce a completely new procedure for excessive imbalance, the Excessive 
Imbalance Procedure. The philosophy underpinning the new provision seems to be 
the correction of trade imbalances across the EU through the enhancement of 
competitiveness.    
However, the direction of the approach adopted seems to have serious 
weaknesses which may jeopardize the functioning of single market. The correction 
of the current account imbalances does not require only the increase of the 
                                               
11 There cannot be taxation without representation. 
12 According to the so-called reverse qualified majority vote, the decision on the sanctions will be 
adopted unless a qualified majority of the Council vote against it.   
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competitiveness of countries with high-level current account deficits but also that 
deviations in both directions should be addressed since the side of surplus countries 
have a great margin of fiscal maneuvers.  A symmetric approach seems more 
appropriate to cope with the solution of imbalances within the EMU (Uxo and Paul, 
2011; Belke, Schnabl and Zemanek, 2010; Goodhart and Tsomocos, 2010; Pisany-
Ferry, 2010; Dadush and Eidelman, 2010; Stockhammer, 2010). On the contrary, the 
Commission decided to promote an asymmetric approach which is based on the 
reasoning that current account deficits or trade deficits are the results of the lack of 
competitiveness, and surpluses come from the high-level economic efficiency, hence 
aiming at the improvement of competitiveness for the entire euro area (Wyplosz, 
2010; Budesbank, 2010). Notwithstanding, the asymmetric approach ignores the fact 
that there is an intense interdependence among the member states as far as the trade 
is related. The structure of EU trade (intra-community trade mainly) suggests that if 
a member-state increases its competitiveness, another country must lose 
competitiveness. Overall improvement of EU competitiveness can be achieved only 
if the terms of trade with the rest of world become better.  
Furthermore, it is generally accepted that macroeconomic imbalances within 
a monetary union are not necessarily negative as they demonstrate an improvement 
of the regional allocation of capital (Von Hagen, 2010). Also, changes in 
competitiveness reflect the convergence of standards of living for certain countries 
in the euro area. Finally, it is likely that under the procedure of trade imbalances 
correction there may be conflicts with other areas of EU policy such as regional 
development policy, labor market policy, single market policy etc.  
Finally, technical problems are unavoidable. The competitiveness of an 
entire economy is very difficult to determine as the relative prices and the 
remunerations depend on many aspects of labor and capital market institutions. 
Evaluating and enhancing competitiveness constitutes a difficult task to deal with 
since many criteria which define the production cost must be examined, not only the 
aspect of direct labor cost on which all attention has focused. Lastly, the 
determination of specific thresholds for each member-state beyond which an 
existing imbalance becomes crucial and dangerous lacks technical methodology and 
seems to be unreliable and abstract (Belke, 2010).    
 
5.4 Need for a New Financial Sector 
Taking into account that the major causes of the sovereign debt crisis in the 
Eurozone are the accumulation of private debt and the fiscal indiscipline, the reform 
of European governance should not only focus on the fiscal surveillance framework 
but also on the financial sector and on the conduct of monetary policy.  
The adoption of a permanent mechanism that will help preserve the 
economic and financial stability of the Union itself by providing financial assistance 
and containing specific provisions for debt restructuring should be associated with 
fundamental reforms in the financial sector since debt and banking crisis are the two 
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sides of the same coin. The reforms in the financial system should firstly provide 
clauses and guarantees in order to prevent the outbreak of a new banking crisis and 
secondly they should undertake corrective actions so that the financial sector may be 
sufficiently robust to absorb the impacts of a sovereign default or a potential debt 
restructure.  
The accumulation of the private debt in banks is the greatest concern. 
European institutions should establish a regulatory framework that will govern 
banking transactions and monitor the operation of the banking system. In that 
framework, the sustainability of European banks should be assessed via austere 
stress tests13 monitored and supervised by independent European institutions. 
Actually, a crucial parameter is the monitoring of economic indicators that may 
prevent the creation of bubbles into the financial sector. Authorities should identify 
the risks and send warning and alarms to national authorities so as they can get 
prepared for a potential collapse. 
The Eurozone’s permanent bailout fund with a lending capacity of 500 
billion euro offers financial assistance only to member-states when their regular 
access to market financing is impaired, while the granting of loans and assistance to 
bank institutions depends on the discretionarity of the national authorities. From this 
perspective, if the ESM made room for the support from the banking system with 
extra capitals under specific terms, the moral hazard related with the rescue of banks 
by governments would be reduced significantly. Concerning the involvement of the 
private sector in debt restructuring, this should not be unique and exceptional 
regarding the Greek debt but standardized and identical procedures and provisions 
seem essential to be introduced. In addition to that, these provisions should be 
associated with guarantees and clauses which will indeed ensure the sustainability of 
the banking system. The main conclusion we may derive is that the reform package 
is judged insufficient to improve financial sector stability. This also applies for the 
Basel III process which contains specific measures for broader financial stability. 
We keep our doubts whether the measures provided will make the sector more stable 
and rigid14 over the long run, thus raising economic growth.  Furthermore, an 
ongoing issue of great concern is the debate related with the role of rating agencies 
and the operation of derivatives market15. In particular, investors can buy Credit 
Default Swaps (CDS) contracts referencing national debt without owing any 
national bond which implies that there may be financial speculative motives. As 
collective speculative actions may set the stability of the system in danger, EU 
should adopt measures to ban CDS speculation.  
                                               
13 Authorities have to deal with the problem of the undercapitalization of banks and how the latter 
ensure liquidity for the real economy. 
14 There should be provisions which make sure that banks in countries undergoing a debt restructuring 
still have access to the liquidity of ECB or to refinancing through ECB (Fuest, 2011). 
15 Derivative markets are investment markets for financial instruments that get their value, or at least 
part of their value, from the value of another security, which is called the underlier.    
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It is also considered essential that European authorities push towards a 
bilateral agreement with countries known as tax havens in order to get valuable 
fiscal information for the fight against tax evasion and corruption, giving European 
societies inter alia a sense of justice.  
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
This paper made an attempt to answer some crucial economic questions: a) 
whether the limitations of Maastricht criteria and SGP have impaired the ability of 
national authorities to run countercyclical discretionary fiscal policy in the EMU 
context approaching the time period 1981-2010 and b) whether the recent reform of 
the European governance framework seems sufficient to deal with the impacts of the 
current sovereign debt crisis and to restore stability.    
Estimating the model adopted, several interesting conclusions emerge. 
Firstly, discretionary fiscal policy has become less countercyclical overtime as we 
have found a significant reduction in the degree of countercyclicality of 
discretionary fiscal policy. Secondly, there are differences in the manner the two sub 
groups of EZ countries conduct their discretionary fiscal policy. More precisely, the 
countries that form the PIGS are found to run to some extent countercyclical policies 
while the northern countries tend to conduct procyclical fiscal policies after the 
process of monetary integration. Finally, the results confirm the popular view that 
the adoption of national fiscal rules is associated with more sound fiscal policy and 
fiscal discipline. However, readers should take into account the limitations 
associated with the empirical analysis and not to overestimate the findings provided. 
From our perspective, the recent reform does not confront the roots of the 
crisis. The adoption of a stricter SGP will deepen the decline and will reduce the 
flexibility of discretionary fiscal policy to be used as a stabilizing tool. The 
introduction of Excessive Imbalance Procedure seems to be in the right direction but 
a symmetric approach is needed. Lastly, we lay emphasis on the need for reforms in 
the financial sector in order the European economy to be shield from future crises. 
Concluding, we want to stress that even though we have identified several 
weaknesses and flaws concerning the nature of the recent European governance 
reform and its appropriateness, we would rather to consider our remarks and the 
context of our critical review in general, as useful caveats to the debate opened 
about the future of EMU.     
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